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NOTES
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES BEYOND THE SCHOLARSHIP AND
STUDENT ADMISSIONS AREAS
In Podberesky v. Kirwan, the Fourth Circuit held that a University of
Maryland scholarship designated for African-American students violated the
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. In so holding, the court contributed
to the recent tradition of dismantling affirmative action programs in higher
education. This Note explores the implications of Podberesky for other uni-
versity settings, particularly faculty hiring and endowment programs. The
first part of the Note's analysis concentrates on ways in which the
Podberesky rationale may -be extended to university ,programs other than
scholarships and student admissions. The Fourth Circuit's employment of a
narrow set of factors in reviewing the scholarship program, the court's
restrictive narrowly tailored analysis, and its refusal to recognize the impor-
tance of distinguishing the educational from the employment context for
affirmative action purposes are examined and then applied to faculty pro-
grams. The second part of the Note examines possible ways to distinguish
Podberesky's factual basis from other university affirmative action pro-
grams. This Note concludes that Podberesky will provide a means to limit
further affirmative action in all areas of university administration, and,
therefore, any attempts to increase diversity on a campus should focus more
broadly on diverse subject areas and courses rather than on specific faculty
appointments and endowed chairs.
INTRODUCTION
During the past several years, affirmative action programs have been
under fire, and in some contexts they have been either reduced in scope or
removed altogether. Despite support from the Clinton administration' and
from most higher education leaders for affirmative action programs,2 oppo-
See Pierre Thomas, Reno Vows to Expand Vigilance on Civil Rights, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 1997, at A9 ("The president and I will continue to oppose-at every step of the
way-any wholesale ban on affirmative action in federal law.") (quoting Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno).
2 Rene Sanchez, Colleges Compete for Minority Students by Helping Them Achieve,
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nents of the programs have made inroads to eliminating them. For example,
in 1995 in Adarand v. Pena,3 the Supreme Court overruled its 1990 deci-
sion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC4 by holding that affirmative action
programs of any government actor, whether local, state, or federal, are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.5 That same year, the Regents of the University of
California voted to abolish completely affirmative action programs.6 The
following year, California's voters approved "Proposition 209," which abol-
ished affirmative action programs in contracts, employment, and education
in that state.7 In April 1996, Texas suspended a statewide scholarship pro-
gram for minority students.8 In response, a spokeswoman for the American
Association of State Colleges and Universities noted that "[tihere's a lot
more apprehension out there now about trying to preserve affirmative ac-
tion. '
A Fourth Circuit ruling on a race-based scholarship at the University of
Maryland continues this recent tradition of reducing the allowable scope of
affirmative action. In Podberesky v. Kirwan, ° the Fourth Circuit upheld a
challenge to a scholarship program reserved for African-American stu-
dents." The court used a very confining strict scrutiny standard, 2 thus
WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1996, at Al.
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (holding that minority preference policies of the
Federal Communications Commission do not violate Equal Protection principles).
5 This holding changed the Court's prior decision in Metro Broadcasting, in which
it held that the FCC's minority ownership policies could be analyzed under intermedi-
ate, rather than strict, scrutiny. Id. at 564-65.
6 See generally Tom Hayden & Connie Rice, California Cracks Its Mortarboards,
NATION, Sept. 18, 1995, at 264; Arleen Jacobius, Affirmative Action on Way Out in
Calif., A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 22; Carl C. Jorgensen, The Consequences in California,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 11, 1995, at Bi.
' See Judith Havemann, Limit On Affirmative Action Wins in California, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 1996, at B12. A district court, however, later issued an injunction against
the measure, reasoning that it probably violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wil-
liam Claiborne, Judge Extends Ruling Against California Ban on Affirmative Action,
WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1996, at A4.
' See Rene Sanchez, Worried Texas Officials Suspend Program for Minority Schol-
arships, WASH. POST, April 17, 1996, at A3. Texas cited a fear of possible legal chal-
lenges based on the Fifth Circuit ruling in Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996), which forbade public universities from using race-
based admissions policies to achieve a diverse student body. See Sanchez, supra, at A3.
9 Sanchez, supra note 8, at A3.
10 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
'1 Id. at 161-62.
12 The Fourth Circuit applied the test promulgated by the Supreme Court in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), rather than the test used in United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), which permits consideration of a wider variety
of factors. See Recent Cases-Constitutional Law-Equal Protection--Fourth Circuit
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creating concerns over what other types of affirmative action programs
might fall to equal protection challenges. Specifically, the court found inade-
quate support for the University of Maryland's contentions that it suffered
from present effects of past discrimination 3 and that African-American stu-
dents had lower representation and higher attrition rates.' The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the program was not narrowly tailored to the extent that it
could withstand a constitutional challenge by a student ineligible for a schol-
arship because of his race.15
The Fourth Circuit in Podberesky reduced the role of affirmative action
in the college and university context. The effects of Podberesky may be far-
reaching. In the student admissions area, for example, about two-thirds of
colleges and universities in the United States reserve some scholarship mon-
ey exclusively for minority students. 6 Podberesky could fundamentally al-
ter the way American colleges and universities allocate financial aid. 7 On
a larger scale, Podberesky might cause a reexamination of some assumptions
about college and university admissions programs. 8
This Note examines Podberesky's implications on college and university
policies other than those regarding student admissions and scholarships, such
as college and university endowments and faculty hiring. Part I examines
the specific holding in Podberesky, and Part II traces briefly the history'of
judicial scrutiny of equal protection challenges to affirmative action pro-
grams in both the college and university and the employment settings and
analyzes current trends in this area. Part III explores the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in Podberesky and how it could limit affirmative action in other
college and university contexts. Finally, Part IV discusses the remaining
constitutionally permissible justifications for affirmative action programs and
the methods colleges and universities, may use to create diversity that may
be permissible under the Fourth Circuit's opinion.
Finds University of Maryland Minority Scholarship Program Unconstitutional, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1995) [hereinafter Recent Cases].
" Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 154 (finding insufficient present effects in the University's
asserted poor reputation in the African-American community and campus climate hostile
to African-Americans).
14 Id. at 156.
"5 Id. at 161. The court noted that a scholarship aimed at correcting underrepresen-
tation does nothing to solve that problem when the scholarship is awarded to high-
achieving African-American students who have not suffered from past discrimination.
Id.
16 See Joseph P. Shapiro, How Much Is Enough?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
13, 1995, at 38.
'" See infra Part III (discussing Podberesky's possible effects).
"8 See Peter Schrag, Affirmative Action's California Afterlife, AM. PROSPECT, Fall
1995, at 84.
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I. BACKGROUND: PODBERESKY V. KIRWAN
Until 1994, the University of Maryland at College Park maintained two
separate merit-based scholarship programs for admitted students. 9 One, the
Francis Scott Key Scholarship, was open to all admitted students.' The
other, the Benjamin Banneker Scholarship, was open only to African-Ameri-
can students.2' In Podberesky v. Kirwan,22 Podberesky, an Hispanic/white
student sued the University, challenging the constitutionality of the
Banneker Scholarship.
The federal district court in Maryland that heard the Podberesky case
ruled that the Banneker Scholarship was constitutionally permissible.23
Podberesky appealed, and the Fourth Circuit remanded the case and required
that the district court make specific findings concerning the present effects
of past discrimination against African-American students at the University of
Maryland.'
To aid the district court, the University independently explored whether
the Banneker Scholarship program should continue.' Aided by the
University's study, the district court found several present effects of past
discrimination that supported continuing the Banneker program. Specifically,
it noted the following: the University's poor reputation within the African-
American community, particularly among parents, high school counselors,
and prospective students;26 the underrepresentation of African-American
students within the student body;27 a disproportionately high attrition rate
for African-Americans;28 and a perception at the University that its campus
climate is hostile to African-Americans.29
At the conclusion of its opinion, the district court discussed the appro-
priate standard of review of affirmative action programs in the college and
university context.3" Noting that the current standard of review "finds its
" Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 1994).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991), rev'd., 956 F.2d 52 (4th
Cir. 1992), on remand, 838 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 147 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
' The federal district court ruled that the Banneker Scholarship was constitutionally
permissible because it served the compelling governmental interest of remedying the
present effects of past discrimination and it was "narrowly tailored" to serve this inter-
est. Id. at 371-76.
24 Podberesky, 956 F.2d at 57.
'5 Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at 1076.
26 Id. at 1084.
27 Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1091.
29 Id. at 1092.
30 Id. at 1097.
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genesis in the context of employment discrimination,"3 the district court
asserted that the employment standard fails to take into account the particu-
larly offensive nature of discrimination in education.32 Citing both prece-
dent33 and relevant, common sense factors,' the district court suggested a
new strict scrutiny analysis designed for the educational context.35 The
court suggested additional factors for consideration in the educational con-
text, including whether school officials engaged in an open decisionmaking
process,' whether officials provided the reasoning for their conclusion that
a problem requiring correction existed,3" and whether the chosen remedy
minimally impacted the rights and interests of those not benefited."
When the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's amended order, it
rejected both the lower court's findings of present effects of past discrimina-
tion 'and its promulgation of a modified standard of review.39 The Fourth
Circuit rejected the justifications based on the school's poor reputation with-
in the African-American community and its allegedly racially hostile campus
climate, finding those factors "tied solely to knowledge of the University's
discrimination before it admitted African-American students."4 Further,
according to the Fourth Circuit, "mere knowledge of historical fact is not
the kind of present effect that can justify a race-exclusive remedy."'"
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 The court noted that the Supreme Court previously has recognized that discrimi-
nation in an educational context is more detrimental than in other contexts. Id. at 1097
(citing United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (illustrating that education's im-
portance leads the Court to consider broad remedies encompassing a state's entire sys-
tem, rather than just a single school); Keyes v. School. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973) (noting that, based on education's societal importance, the Court has created
affirmative duties in the desegregation area); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (discussing the fundamental importance of education in society)).
3 Id. at 1098. The court noted the role of public education in forming social values,
the history of discrimination and prejudice, the naivete in the assertion that centuries of
bigotry could be erased with twenty years of corrective measures, and the irony in the
premise that the current generation can't cure racism's effects because "we, not our
parents and grandparents," are their source. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. The court's analysis included three other relevant factors: whether a nucleus of
facts existed that could be interpreted as evidence of racism's effects, whether members
of the benefitting race controlled the decisionmaking body, and whether provision for
periodic review had been made. Id.
39 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128
(1995).
40 Id. at 154.
41 Id. The Fourth Circuit found another flaw in the University's assertion of a hostile
campus climate-it had failed to show a connection between that effect and past dis-
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The Fourth Circuit asserted several reasons for rejecting the district
court's conclusions regarding the underrepresentation and higher attrition
rates for African-American students. First, it faulted the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the University, holding that a material issue of fact
existed regarding the cause of the disproportionate numbers.42 Because the
plaintiff offered evidence that tended to show that the statistics regarding
African-American students resulted from economic factors, the defendant
was not entitled to summary judgment.43
The Fourth Circuit found further error with the reference pool that the
lower court used in its analysis." Although the district court correctly re-
jected the use of a pool consisting of all graduating high school seniors, the
Fourth Circuit noted that the court wrongly attempted to resolve a factual
question-what constitutes an effective minimum admissions criteria.45 The
appellate court stated that the program's goal disallowed lowering the effec-
tive minimum criteria for purposes of determining the applicant pool.46
Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the Banneker program was not
narrowly tailored.47 The court agreed with the district court's finding that
the program successfully attracted high-achieving African-American stu-
dents, thus improving representation and retention rates." Yet, because
high achievers were not the group against whom the University had discrim-
inated in the past, the program was not sustainable under that rationale.
Furthermore, awarding Banneker scholarships to nonresident African-Amer-
ican students prevented the program from accomplishing its stated goal of
assisting "qualified African-American high school students [from] Mary-
land."5 ° The Fourth Circuit also took issue with the district court's reason-
ing that admitted, high-achieving African-American students would remedy
the problems in representation by serving as role models and mentors to
other African-American students. 51 That rationale, the court noted, has been
impermissible since the Supreme Court's decision in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education.52
crimination. Id.
42 The Fourth Circuit stated that "it is not enough for the district court to determine
that the moving party has the winning legal argument." Id. at 156.
43 Id.
"Id.
41 Id. at 156-57.
46 Id. at 157.
47 Id. at 161.
48 Id. at 158.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 159.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 152 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plu-
rality opinion)).
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II. SUPREME COURT SCRUTINY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
In Brown v. Board of Education,53 the Supreme Court first announced
the end of segregated educational systems in its holding that "separate but
equal" education violates the Equal Protection Clause.54 When the Court
revisited Brown the following year,55 it ordered the dissolution of segregat-
ed public school education,56 yet recognized that difficulties in integrating
schools would not be immediately corrected.
The first significant affirmative action case since Brown was Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke," which dealt with minority prefer-
ences in university admissions. Bakke, a twice-rejected nonminority appli-
cant to the University of California at Davis medical school, challenged the
school's reservation of sixteen percent of its admission spaces for minor-
ities.5" Although the Court agreed that the medical school's admissions pro-
gram failed to withstand strict scrutiny, Justice Powell's plurality opinion
included a much-analyzed line indicating that one's status as a minority
could not be a determinative factor in college and university admissions but
could be permissibly considered, along with other factors, as a "plus."59
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, ° the Court upheld an affir-
mative action program in the employment context. At issue was the Minori-
ty Business Enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act,6'
which dictated that recipients of federal funds for state and local building
projects must spend ten percent of those funds on purchases of goods and
services from minority-owned businesses.62 The Court found the require-
ment narrowly tailored to further a valid Congressional objective: redressing
past Congressional discrimination in contracting.63
'3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14 Id. at 495.
"s Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11).
56 Id. at 301.
5' 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
51 Id. at 276-78.
'9 Id. at 317. Numerous writers have analyzed this line. See, e.g., Michael K.
Braswell et al., Affirmative Action: An Assessment of Its Continuing Role in Employ-
ment Discrimination Policy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 365, 380-81 (1993); Eric Hilbritton, Re-
cent Development, Hopwood v. Texas: Affirmative Action Encounters a Formidable and
Fatal Match, 71 TUL. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1996); Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution
and Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 MICH. Bus. L.J., 1160, 1160-61
(1996); Barbara Phillips Sullivan, The Song That Never Ends: New Verses About Affir-
mative Action, 23 S.U. L. REV., 157, 166-70 (1996).
60 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
61 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1994).
62 448 U.S. at 454.
63 Id. at 492.
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In another employment case,' the Court upheld a court-ordered minori-
ty preference implemented to redress prior discrimination by a union.65 The
Court based its holding on the trial court's finding of pervasive and continu-
ing discrimination by the union.'
The Court's next landmark affirmative action decision was Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,67 in which it struck down a collective bar-
gaining agreement that afforded more lay-off protection for minority school
teachers than for their nonminority colleagues. Several aspects of this case
are particularly applicable to the current inquiry into college and university
affirmative action programs. First, the Court required a strong evidentiary
basis as a condition for remedial action; a showing of broad societal dis-
crimination is insufficient.6" Second, the Court held that one of the educa-
tional board's primary asserted justifications for affording greater protection
to minority teachers-that minority teachers served as role models for mi-
nority students-did not shield the agreement from an equal protection
claim.69 Finally, and significantly for any type of affirmative action case,
the Court stated explicitly that strict scrutiny applies to equal protection re-
view of programs that benefit minorities, just as it applies to programs that
discriminate against them.7"
In United States v. Paradise,7 the Court upheld a court-ordered, nu-
merically based hiring goal as a remedy for past discrimination.72 In con-
trast, in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co,73 the Court rejected a munici-
' Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
65 Id. at 444-47.
6 Id. at 445.
67 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
6 Id. at 277-78. The Court did not elaborate on this evidence requirement. Rather, it
merely stated that the ultimate burden lies with the employees to demonstrate the un-
constitutionality of an affirmative action program. Id. at 278. The lower court had con-
cluded that any statistical disparities in the racial composition of the faculty resulted
only from general societal discrimination, as opposed to prior discrimination by the
school board. Id. at 278 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp 1195
(1982), affid, 746 F.2d 1152 (1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). This finding by the
lower court was particularly easy to uphold because the school board had denied allega-
tions of prior discriminatory hiring practices when confronted with earlier litigation. See
id.
69 Id. at 276. Rejecting the role model theory, the Court expressed concern that al-
lowing affirmative action programs to be justified by the need to provide role models
for minority students would have no terminus. Id. at 274-75. The Court noted that such
programs would extend beyond legitimate remedial goals if faculty hiring goals were
tied to the percentage of minority students. Id.
70 Id. at 279-80.
7- 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
72 Id. at 185-86; see infra Part III (discussing the factors the Court employed).
7' 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see infra Part III (discussing Croson).
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pal minority business set-aside similar to that in Fullilove. The Court distin-
guished Croson from Fullilove by noting that "Congress, [not the Richmond
City Council] ... has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dic-
tates of the Fourteenth Amendment."'74 Thus, the holding appeared to rest
in part upon a separation of powers rationale and the Court's interest in
deferring to Congress. In addition; the Court faulted the program in Croson
for being based on generalized past discrimination rather than on specific
findings.75
Finally, in United States v. Fordice,76 the Court recognized a state's
affirmative duty to dismantle prior dual school systems," including those
in the higher education domain.78 Moreover, the Court found that although
higher education involves a larger element of student choice, 79 a state's
adoption and implementation of race-neutral policies alone is insuffi-
cient 8° -the state must also ensure that a student's choice is truly free."
To ensure this result, the Court required states to dismantle de jure segre-
gated school systems and to remove any remnants of the prior system that
fostered de facto dual systems.82
III. PODBERESKY'S POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON. OTHER COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS
The Fourth Circuit had several opportunities in Podberesky to weigh in
on current debates about affirmative action and the role it should play in
college and university settings. Specifically, it analyzed whether the
Banneker Scholarship was narrowly tailored, and it rejected the idea that
educational and employment contexts must be treated differently. The
court's adoption of a "narrowly tailored" standard in Podberesky may cause
institutions to structure other programs to conform with that difficult stan-
dard.
74 Id. at 490.
71 Id. at 496-97.
76 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
77 Id. at 727.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 728-29.
0 Id.
81 Id. at 742-43.
82 Id. at 728-30. In Fordice, for example, the Court identified discriminatory admis-
sions standards and duplicative academic programs at historically segregated state col-
leges and universities as some of the remnants of the prior segregated system. Id. at
733.
83 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1128 (1995).
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A. Using the Croson Factors Instead of the Paradise Test
In Podberesky, the Fourth Circuit applied the two-prong test that the Su-
preme Court promulgated in Croson.84 Croson involved a challenge to
Richmond's "Minority Business Utilization Plan" based on the plan's re-
quirement that at least thirty percent of the value of city contracts be sub-
contracted to minority businesses.8 ' The Court reaffirmed its commitment
to place under strict scrutiny any race-based preference programs, whether
remedial or not. The Court noted that the standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause86 "is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefited by a particular classification."87 The Court struck down the
minority business set-aside program because the city showed only a general-
ized discrimination in the construction business rather than specific, past
discrimination in the city's construction contracts awarding process.88 The
generalized discrimination that the city proffered failed to demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest.89 The Court also rejected the plan on the
grounds that it was not narrowly tailored.9"
The Fourth Circuit limited its review to these factors from Croson rather
than considering the wider variety of factors analyzed in United States v.
Paradise.9 In Paradise, the Supreme Court upheld a court-ordered require-
ment that African-Americans receive fifty percent of new promotions in the
Alabama state police force until either the force achieved a desegregated mi-
nority percentage or the troopers adopted a new promotion plan that con-
formed with prior court orders and decrees.92
Id. at 153-54 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
8' Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78.
86 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
'7 Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
279-80 (1985)).
88 Id. at 499-501.
89 Id.
o Id. at 508. Specifically, the city had made no attempt to employ race-neutral rem-
edies for increasing minority contract participation. The Court listed as an example of a
race-neutral institution a race-neutral program of city financing for small businesses.
This remedy would be preferable if minority business enterprises simply lacked the
capital to bid on contracts. The record contained no evidence that any race-neutral alter-
natives had been considered. Additionally, the 30% figure stipulated in the city's plan
was based on the overall minority representation in the population, and it incorrectly
assumed that an equivalent proportion of minorities participated in the construction
industry. See id. at 507-08.
9' 480 U.S. 149 (1987); see Recent Cases, supra note 12, at 1775-76.
92 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 149. The court imposed this requirement in response to past
discrimination by the Department in its entry-level hiring and promotion practices. Id. at
163.
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The Court considered a broad array of factors.93 These factors, which
encompass those considered in Croson,94 included the necessity for relief,
the efficacy of alternative remedies, the flexibility and duration of relief,
including available waiver provisions, the availability of numerical goals to
the relevant labor market, and the impact of relief on third-parties' rights.95
The Fourth Circuit provided two reasons for declining to employ the
Paradise factors. First, the court noted that unlike the program at issue in
Paradise, the Banneker program did not involve a quota requirement.96
Second, the court highlighted the similarity between Croson and the
Banneker program: although Croson involved a quota,97 it also examined
the present effects of past discrimination.98
If the Podberesky analysis had included all of the Paradise factors, the
Banneker program might have survived the challenge. For example, the
necessity of the scholarship program could have been predicated on Title VI
regulations, which require federal funding recipients to use affirmative ac-
tion to remedy prior discrimination."°° Further, it is possible that the
Banneker program guidelines, which required a reevaluation of the program
every three years, was adequately flexible,'0 1 had goals that bore a proper
relationship to the relevant student population,0 2 and placed only a mini-
mal burden on third parties."3
If the Banneker program would have survived an equal protection chal-
lenge under Paradise's five-factor test, then it is likely that other college
and university affirmative action programs also would benefit from
Paradise's broad inquiry. Tenure-track hiring goals, for example, can be
limited in duration and periodically reevaluated to accommodate Paradise's
flexibility. Decisions regarding endowed chairs may be made after annual
faculty hiring, thereby minimizing possible effects on third parties. Race-
neutral hiring attempts foreseeably could fail to attract a sufficient number
93 Id. at 171.
9 Id. at 149.
95 Id. at 171.
9 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d. 147, 158 n.10 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1128 (1995).
7 Id.
98 Id. While declining to use the broader Paradise inquiry, the court nevertheless
stated that the Banneker program also would have failed had such factors been em-
ployed. Id.
9 Recent Cases, supra note 12, at 1776.
100 Id. at 1776-77. The Comment notes that the existence of the Banneker Scholar-
ship was a condition to the approval of the University of Maryland's plan to comply
with federal affirmative action regulations. Id.
101 Id. at 1777.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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of minority professors, necessitating alternative race-conscious remedies. For
the above reasons, the Fourth Circuit's decision to follow Croson, in which
the Supreme Court "did not conduct a full 'narrowly tailored' analysis,"' 4
likely will result in future harm to both university scholarship programs and
to faculty hiring affirmative action programs.
B. A More Narrow Narrowly Tailored Analysis
Another way in which the Fourth Circuit restricted its narrowly tailored
analysis was through its focus on the scholarship's recipients. 5 In the
court's estimation, one of the Banneker program's flaws that prohibited the
court from finding the program narrowly tailored was that although it was
structured to remedy problems such as low retention and representation rates
among minority students, the scholarship recipients were high-achieving
African-American students." These students, the court determined, were
not the group against whom the college or university had previously dis-
criminated."° The question left unanswered after Podberesky is whether a
college or university's affirmative action program can ever constitutionally
redress a harm previously suffered.
The court's focus on the group previously discriminated against may be
easily extended to the faculty setting." 8 Robert Simon argues, for example,
that candidates for faculty positions are not considered victims, despite their
minority group membership. Rather, they are advantaged relative to the
general population.0 9 Simon further argues that members of this group,
who have been successful in academic settings, probably have already bene-
fited from some sort of preference and so already have received some com-
pensation for past harms.'
A similar argument has been made that affirmative action programs
assist a few minorities at the expense of a great number of minorities who
need more help."' Others counter that affirmative action programs should
104 Id. at 1776.
105 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 158 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1128 (1995).
106 Id.
107 Id.
18 See Robert L. Simon, Affirmative Action and the University: Faculty Appointment
and Preferential Treatment, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE UNIVERSITY 48, 58 (Ste-
ven M. Cahn ed., 1993).
109 Id.
110 Id.
" Drew S. Days, III, Reality, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 169, 190 (1994). The author
attributed this idea to Professor Richard Epstein and found his argument wholly specu-
lative. Id.
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redress past discrimination"' rather than address the current problems of
impoverished African-Americans.113 Recalling that affirmative action pro-
grams attempt to remove discrimination based upon race," 4 the two coun-
ter-arguments thus conflict over the appropriate scale of past discrimination
in determining the correct group to receive the benefits of affirmative action.
Many courts have not subscribed to the notion that affirmative action
programs exist to redress broad discriminatory effects. Rather, as the Fourth
Circuit held, because the University of Maryland had identified high-achiev-
ing students as the typical Banneker Scholarship recipients, the program did
not meet its asserted goal of remedying past discrimination."5 Therefore,
by deeming the Banneker program to be too broad, the Fourth Circuit
weighed in on the debate concerning how to measure the scale of past dis-
crimination.
Podberesky invites the argument that minority candidates for faculty
positions are well-situated relative to a majority of their race. Moreover,
Podberesky arguably allows other extensions to the faculty setting, thus
preventing the hiring of a diverse faculty. As noted above, 6 Simon argues
that faculty candidates have already benefited from affirmative action poli-
cies, and thus have been compensated."7 This reasoning is dangerous to
minorities. First, it assumes that without these programs, minorities would
never have been situated so as to attempt to gain spaces on a college or uni-
versity faculty. Inferentially, this reasoning also assumes that a minority
candidate with weaker credentials should be rejected not only because hiring
decisions should be merit-based but also because that applicant did not de-
serve even those weaker credentials. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine
when an African-American who has suffered specific discriminatory harm in
the past has been fully compensated for that harm.
C. Refusing to Distinguish the Education from the Employment Setting
The district court in Podberesky proffered another argument for permit-
ting continuation of the scholarship program: educational affirmative action
programs should be considered under different standards (although still
adhering to strict scrutiny) from those used in the employment setting."8
112 Id. at 191.
113 Days asserts that the disparity between middle-class and poor African-Americans
may more properly be traced to the absence of social programs designed to improve the
conditions that leave them at the margins of the American economy. Id.
114 Id.
15 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 158 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1128 (1995).
116 See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
117 Simon, supra note 108, at 58.
"' Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1097 (D. Md. 1993).
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Although it is admittedly not the orthodox view of affirmative action scruti-
ny," 9 the Fourth Circuit's swift rejection of that thesis imperils a view that
may be necessary for the continuation of affirmative action programs in
student admissions. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's refusal to recognize such
a distinction between the education and employment contexts is another
important factor from Podberesky that will certainly extend the limitations
of affirmative action programs beyond the student admissions context. The
college and university context is highly unusual, and perhaps should be
treated differently." In support of the need to treat universities differently
is the fact that a college faculty member's role differs from roles in other
employment settings in that it involves dissemination of viewpoints and per-
spectives.
A district court decision in Texas also indicated that the educational
situation should be treated differently from other affirmative action con-
texts."' In Hopwood v. Texas,122 several nonminority applicants to the
University of Texas Law School challenged the school's affirmative action
program for student admissions after the school denied their applica-
tions.2 2 Although the district court found that the University of Texas pro-
gram failed to meet strict scrutiny requirements,' it rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the review of past acts of discrimination must be confined to
the law school and could not encompass the University of Texas system."2
Instead, noting the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Fordice,'2 the dis-
trict court found that "it appears the Supreme Court has recognized that the
restrictions it has applied in ascertaining the present effects of past discrimi-
nation in the employment context ... are not appropriate in the educational
context."1
27
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning but
affirmed it's ruling for the plaintiffs."2 Although the Fifth Circuit did not
directly address whether the educational forum should receive special treat-
ment, it rejected any notion that attainment of a diverse student body could
119 See Podberesky, 38 .F.3d at 153.
120 See, e.g., Hayden & Rice, supra note 6, at 264 ("Diversity is an especially
weighty educational value for a public university.").
"2 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571 (1994), affid., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 553.
124 Id. at 578, 579 (finding the law school admission process not narrowly tailored
because it compared each applicant not with the entire pool of applicants but rather with
only those of his or her race).
'25 Id. at 571-72.
126 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
127 Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571.
128 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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be a compelling state interest: "We agree with the plaintiffs that any consid-
eration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a
diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
'I 9
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit chose not to endorse the asser-
tion that affirmative action scrutiny should differ between the college and
university and employment contexts. In Podberesky, the Fourth Circuit
readily dismissed the district court's suggestion that a different test should
be applied in the educational context."3' Rather than considering the dis-
trict court's suggestion of a separate standard for educational settings, 131
the Fourth Circuit noted the lower court's "restlessness in complying with
that standard,' 32 and decided that the district court opinion indicated an
unspoken belief that the Banneker program was unable to withstand strict
scrutiny analysis.
3 3
IV. WHAT'S LEFT? OR, How TO CONTINUE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
OTHER UNIVERSITY CONTEXTS
A. Diversity in Areas Other Than Student Admissions and Scholarships
Courts can justify treating affirmative action programs in educational
contexts differently from those in other contexts on the grounds that diver-
sity is still a permissible goal for universities to pursue." The diversity
rationale has greater importance on college campuses than in the
workplace. 131 "Diversity should not justify the use of racial classifications
in any context other than education because no other social institution has
such a dramatic effect on one's life."' 36
9 Id. at 944. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving in place the statements
rejecting educational diversity as a compelling interest. Justices Breyer and Ginsberg,
however, released a statement suggesting that the refusal "was based on procedural
grounds and should not be interpreted as a sign of how the high court eventually would
rule on whether it is constitutional for colleges to use race in deciding whom to admit."
Joan Biskupic, Justices Decline to Hear Campus Diversity Case; Ruling Against Race-
Based Admissions Stands, WASH. POST, July 2, 1996, at Al.
'3' Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2001 (1995). The Fourth Circuit wrote only, "[W]e reject the district court's contention
that its proposed analysis is the correct one." Id. at n.1.
't' Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1097 (D. Md. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d
147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
'32 Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153.
133 Id.
"3 See infra notes 139-58 and accompanying text.
131 See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
'3 Krista L. Cosner, Note, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons and
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Professor Richard Delgado wrote a hypothetical trial court opinion based
on a claim that a white male brought against a school that had denied him a
faculty position because the law school sought minority candidates. 37
Delgado's essay includes some of the testimony heard in the fictional case,
which provided several reasons for diversity's continued importance in affir-
mative action faculty hiring programs. Among those reasons were that law
school students benefit from exposure to the ideas and viewpoints of women
and minorities; that law students in particular benefit from exposure to mi-
nority professors because, as role models, minority professors foster client
sensitivity; and that a diverse faculty encourages minorities to pursue legal
careers.1
38
Professor Sheila Foster offers an additional reason to support the diver-
sity rationale. 139 Foster argues that the diversity rationale operates to in-
clude individuals whose differences have created a basis for systematic dis-
advantage and exclusion. 4 ° Although this focus is more remedial 4' than
achievement of campus diversity, it considers that the value of diversity
derives from the inclusion and participation of formerly excluded and
disempowered individuals.' This rationale has the advantage of answer-
ing critics who argue that diversity programs force women and minorities to
conform to expected viewpoints and attitudes in exchange for their presence
on campus.'43 Another advantage of Foster's rationale is that courts are
more likely to recognize remedial goals than goals of diversity for
diversity's sake. 44"
Foster drew support for her diversity rationale from two Supreme Court
opinions. Foster contrasts Metro Broadcasting'4 5 with Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke.'46 Justice Powell's opinion represents the Court's hold-
ing at least to the extent that it interpreted Title VI. 14 Calling Powell's di-
Directions from the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1024 (1996).
' Richard Delgado, Five Months Later (The Trial Court Opinion), 71 TEx. L. REV.
1011 (1993).
138 Id. at 1015.
139 Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of
"Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 141-42.
140 Id. at 141.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 142. That argument, however, lacks merit when the reason for promoting
diversity depends not on diversity of viewpoint but on diversity of social background.
'" See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding that
racial classifications must be reserved for remedial purposes).
145 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
146 Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
147 See id. at 269-324 (opinion of Powell, J.); Gabriel Chin, Bakke To The Wall: The
Crisis of Bakkean Diversity 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 885 (1996).
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versity paradigm "forward-looking," Foster first noted that Powell's opinion
rested on a free speech rationale, that it largely ignored the broader equality
concerns, and that it is therefore an ill-suited means for analyzing diversity
and equality issues."8 The Metro Broadcasting opinion, in contrast, is a
hybrid: it incorporates Powell's forward-looking paradigm with the Court's
backward-looking equal protection jurisprudence.'49 Metro Broadcasting
may also be considered backward-looking because it generally addresses
only past discrimination rather than recognizing a future value in diversi-
ty. 5 ' Although Metro Broadcasting was overruled,' Foster might argue
that her diversity rationale remains valid because it is based upon a remedy
for past harms rather than on creation of a racially and ethnically diverse
faculty.
Foster found additional support for a forward-looking diversity rationale
in Justice Stevens's opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.'
Stevens's opinion noted that "race is not always irrelevant to sound govern-
ment decisionmaking"'53 and also recognized the special benefits of a ra-
cially diverse school faculty.'54
The district court opinion in Hopwood v. Texas'55 also cited diversity
as a compelling interest. In Hopwood, the district court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the only remaining compelling interest in the affir-
mative action context is remedying the effects of past discrimination.'56
The court refuted this proposition in part because the cases that the plaintiffs
cited were in the employment context, not education, and thus did not focus
on the unique role of education."' The court concluded that unless the Su-
preme Court overrules Bakke, "the educational benefits that flow from a
racially and ethnically diverse student body remain[] a sufficiently compel-
ling interest to support the use of racial classifications.'
58
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court in Hopwood by granting
relief to the plaintiffs,'59 but it questioned the district court's use of the di-
148 Foster, supra note 139, at 122.
149 Id.
10 Id. at 123.
' See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
152 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Foster, supra note 139, at 114.
155 861 F. Supp. 551, 570-71 (1994), affid. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2581 (1996). The Fifth Circuit rejected the diversity rationale. See supra notes
155-59 and accompanying text.
156 Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570-71.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 571.
159 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996).
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versity rationale. 16' The Fifth Circuit stated that any consideration of race
by a law school for the purposes of achieving a diverse student body was
not a compelling state interest.' 6' Although the Fifth Circuit noted that Su-
preme Court decisions on education have recognized only remedial state
interests as compelling, 162 the court relied primarily on Croson,163 which
was not an education case, in its rejection of the diversity standard."6
In rejecting the diversity rationale, the Fifth Circuit quoted Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting: "'Modern equal protection has
recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of
racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast
viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest.""' 65 The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, deemphasized an earlier comment by Justice O'Connor that "'a state
interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently
'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support the use
of racial considerations in furthering that interest."",16 6 Justice O'Connor's
statements, read together, indicate a possible willingness by members of the
Court to reject a diversity rationale in other contexts but to accept it in edu-
cation.'67 Therefore, the district court in Hopwood may have been correct
to wait for an explicit statement from the Supreme Court regarding the death
of diversity in the educational context. 6 Furthermore, diversity as a goal
beyond the makeup of a student body'69 may be distinguishable from stu-
160 Id. at 941-45.
161 Id. at 945.
162 Id. (noting that although Bakke recognized diversity as a compelling interest, that
portion of the opinion did not express a majority view and thus is questionable as bind-
ing precedent).
163 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
164 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. The Fifth Circuit said that recent Supreme Court pre-
cedent shows that diversity cannot satisfy strict scrutiny and noted that the diversity
rationale in Croson survived only because it was analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.
Id. The Fifth Circuit went on to cite language from Croson that suggests a belief that
racial classifications must be reserved for the remedial setting. Id.
165 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 612) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
166 Id. at 945 n.27 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286
(1986)). The Fifth Circuit minimized Justice O'Connor's earlier statement by explaining
it had been "purely descriptive" and did not express her approval or disapproval of
diversity as a compelling interest. Id. Justice O'Connor's statement, although not neces-
sarily her personal opinion, could be interpreted as her belief in the current state of the
law.
167 See David Schimmel, Is Bakke Still Good Law? The .Fifth Circuit Says "No" and
Outlaws Affirmative Action Admissions, 113 Educ. L. Rep. 1052, 1060 n.56 (Dec. 26,
1996).
16' Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 570-71.
169 Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570-71.
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dent admissions limitations.
Commentators have opposed, on several grounds, the diversity rationale
as a valid reason for promoting affirmative action policies in schools. For
example, the need for minority scholarships is frequently questioned.170
Others question the value of the minority perspective altogether. 7' Profes-
sor Delgado, for example, takes issue with allowing increased minority
admissions under the diversity rationale because such admissions are pref-
aced upon the minority students' Value to the majority.' The result, Pro-
fessor Delgado fears, will be that minority students will be treated as orna-
ments and curiosities.
173
B. Distinguishing Faculty Affirmative Action from Student Admissions
Affirmative Action
There are several practical reasons for adopting different analytical ap-
proaches to the different affirmative action programs in higher education
contexts. Using different approaches, one may distinguish endowment pro-
grams and faculty hiring preferences from affirmative action in admissions
and scholarship programs and thereby render Podberesky inapplicable to
those areas. The goals are distinct-a diverse student body may result in
interaction among groups that might not otherwise be in the same forum,
but a diverse faculty is more likely to expose students to diverse philoso-
phies and viewpoints and generally to produce different contributions to
scholarship. 74
170 In 1991, for example, the Department of Education's Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights announced that race-based scholarships violated the Civil Rights Act. See
Cosner, supra note 140, at 1015; see also Editorial, A Special Editorial on Affirmative
Action: An Uneven Playing Field, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Feb. 11, 1996, at G6 (dis-
cussing the plans of State Representative to the General Assembly Earl Ehrhart to intro-
duce a constitutional amendment to end all programs, including scholarships, that help
minorities).
171 U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner, for example, differentiates be-
tween hiring African-American professors and hiring female professors to gain different
viewpoints, noting that although feminism is an identifiable approach, race is not, and
"not all blacks are culturally black and therefore do not add anything to diversity
goals." Richard A. Posner, Comment, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1157, 1160-61.
" Carlos J. Nan, Adding Salt to the Wound: Affirmative Action and Critical Race
Theory, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 553, 567 (1994) (quoting Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561,
570 n.46 (1984)).
173 See id.
174 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. 705, 715 (advocating expansion of a commitment to
cultural diversity and minority hiring because it produces work "not otherwise avail-
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Professor Paul Carrington argues that affirmative action is more detri-
mental when applied to the faculty selection process than when used in
student admissions.17 First, he argues that meritocratic considerations
should be entitled great weight in faculty hiring decisions." Calling atten-
tion to the skill required in teaching law, he finds it significant that "[t]here
are others in some degree dependent on the technical skill with which the
job is performed."' 77 Because of affirmative action programs in faculty se-
lection, students could have less-qualified instructors. 7
Professor Carrington finds further support for eliminating affirmative
action programs in faculty hiring by comparing faculty selection and the
tenure process with student admissions.' Because instructors' peers per-
form tenure inquiries and because these peers are presumably well-acquaint-
ed with the individual both personally and professionally, it is difficult to
ask faculty members making the selection decisions to isolate any single
factor, such as race. 8°
Finally, Professor Carrington asserts that the problem of minority
underrepresentation among law faculty will eventually correct itself as more
minority students enroll in law school and choose to pursue careers in legal
education.' Accepting this argument, however, not only might prompt a
limiting of affirmative action in the sphere of faculty hiring but might actu-
ally necessitate affirmative action in student admissions as a means of
avoiding affirmative action programs in the faculty setting.
Professor Carrington's argument assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that cur-
rent measures of "merit" are just. Arguably, beliefs about "merit" were
formed when minorities were excluded from the developing of such stan-
dards.' There may also be value in particular minority experiences, such
as challenging past discrimination.'83 Programs that seek to increase diver-
sity in the faculty setting may seek to include excluded ideals in what is
considered meritorious, rather than discard merit as a hiring basis altogeth-
able.")
' Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1145 (1992).
176 Id. at 1152.
177 Id. at 1153.
17' Although Professor Carrington argues this point while referring to legal scholars
and law students, presumably the same argument extends to both undergraduate and
other graduate programs as well.
" "Teachers, in contrast, are hired one at a time, and much is known about them as
individuals." Carrington, supra note 175, at 1145.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1153.
182 Yxta Maya Murray, Merit Teaching, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1073, 1075
(1996).
183 Id. at 1108.
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Robert Simon notes the extremely high costs to nonminority faculty
candidates that result from minority preferences in faculty selection." 5 He
suggests that rejected faculty candidates have much more invested in both
their careers and the selection process than do students who apply for ad-
mission at a college or university." 6 Therefore, the cost of rejection for
faculty candidates is higher.'87 According to supporters of this theory, it is
extremely difficult for a candidate for an academic position to receive an
offer for even one desirable position 8 but a student denied admission is
more likely to have other options from which to choose.8 9
The potential benefits of a diverse faculty, however, more than outweigh
any risks inherent in affirmative action hiring practices." Minority faculty
are valuable as mentors and counselors. 191 Moreover, the value of minority
scholarship is heightened because it was less available in the past.y Pro-
fessor Delgado proposed a more unusual argument for promoting faculty
affirmative action in his hypothetical trial court opinion."' In that opinion,
Professor Delgado asserted that the practice of separating faculty applicants
into two groups-minority and non-minority-actually helps non-minority
candidates.'94 The reasoning behind this centers on current trends in educa-
tion, which value diverse scholarship and "politically correct" ideas."'
Professor Delgado's trial court opinion recognizes that because of the
school's separation of minority and non-minority candidates, a non-minority
candidate may avoid being engulfed by the smaller number of other candi-
dates whose minority status is deemed an attractive and trendy quality.'
Arguably, minority scholarship contributes a valuable and different voice
to scholarship on college and university campuses. This assertion is mani-
fested in the "racial distinctiveness" thesis,'97 which holds that because mi-
184 Id. at 1111.
185 See Simon, supra note 108, at 52, 58.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., head of Harvard University's Department of Afro-Ameri-
can Studies, hopes that a strong department in this area "will help the racists from the
cultural and political right ... to understand how important Afro-American studies is to
an understanding of a multicultural America." Jacqueline Trescott, Harvard's Dream
Team, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1996, at B1.
'9' See supra text accompanying note 138.
' See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
193 See Delgado, supra note 137.
19 Id. at 1014.
'95 Id. at 1016.
196 Id. at 1014.
19 Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV.
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nority scholars have experienced racial oppressiveness, they view the world
with a different perspective, which eventually displays itself in valuable
ways in their work. 9
Professor Randall Kennedy also has advanced an "exclusion" thesis,
which argues that at least in legal academia, the mainstream majority too
often wrongfully ignores, or undervalues, the intellectual contributions of the
minority scholars. 99 Professor Duncan Kennedy concurs with the conclu-
sion that there is a special value in minority scholarship that mainstream
scholarship cannot provide, and that this value springs from the unique char:
acter of minority work product.2"
C. Department of Education Guidelines and the Public/Private Actor
Distinction
Generally, race-specific actions are not subject to judicial equal protec-
tion review.2 1 This principle applies to single-race scholarships created by
private entities.2
Although racial designations created by a private institution may not
receive strict judicial scrutiny,2 3 public colleges and universities attract
that attention. Furthermore, the Department of Education ("DOE") has estab-
lished policy guidelines to aid in distinguishing those scholarships that re-
main scrutiny-free based on private donation and those subject to scruti-
1745, 1746 (1989).
198 Id.
I99 d. at 1745-46; see also Murray, supra note 182, at 1075.
200 See generally Kennedy, supra note 174.
201 The equal protection clause is concerned only with state actors: "No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
202 This occurs frequently. One recent example is a scholarship designated for Afri-
can-American students pursuing advertising careers, which was established at the Uni-
versity of Illinois at Champaign by the Foundation of the American Advertising Federa-
tion. A New Scholarship for African-American Students, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1995, at
D6. A more celebrated example is the African-American scholarship established by
Osceola McCarty for the University of Southern Mississippi. At age 87, McCarty donat-
ed her life savings of $150,000, which she earned as a laundress. Michael Kinsley,
Generous Old Lady, or Reverse Racist?, TIME, Aug. 28, 1995, at 76.
203 But see William H. Daugherty, Jr., The Legal. Nature of Academic Freedom in
United States Colleges and Universities, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 233, 257 (1991) (discuss-
ing Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 581 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Douglas referred to several "umbil-
ical cords" connecting private colleges with the state, including federal funding, regula-
tion, and student aid, which could serve to extend First and Fourteenth Amendment
protections to private school faculty. Id.
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ny. The DOE intended its guidelines, published before Podberesky, to
be the Department's final guidance regarding the limitations that Title
V12O5 places on a school's ability to award financial aid based on race or
national origin.206 Title VI states that no one, on the basis of race or na-
tional origin, shall be denied the benefits of, be excluded from, or be dis-
criminated under, any program that receives. federal financial assistance.2 7
The DOE stated that two principles from its policy govern the guide-
lines.2 Principle Three permits a college or university to award financial
aid on the basis of race or national origin if a strong evidential basis indi-
cates that such action is necessary to overcome the effects of past discrimi-
nation.' Principle Four advises that a college or university may allow
race-conscious financial aid awards if the action is both a necessary and
narrowly tailored means of attaining a diverse student body.2 10 Principle
Five combines these two principles to address specifically private funds.'
When public colleges administer and award privately donated funds, Title
VI applies, and the DOE suggests that schools must comply with either
Principle Three or Principle Four.212
The distinction that the guidelines make for private scholarships also
may have significance for endowed chairs. If, for example, a private donor
wished to establish a chair in African-American studies, designated for an
African-American scholar, the degree of control the college retains in ad-
ministration of the endowment may be significant. The nature of an endow-
ment program, however, does not permit a college or university to cede
control in favor of a private donor; hiring a faculty member is not as easy
as selecting a scholarship recipient.
Private donors might attempt to retain some control over their gifts.
Recently, for example, Lee M. Bass donated twenty million dollars to Yale
University213 to endow a new program in Western Civilization. 14 Con-
59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (1997).
2o Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)
Interestingly, the DOE's attempts to establish these guidelines occurred during a
different challenge to minority scholarships by Daniel Podberesky's attorney, Richard
A. Samp. See Washington Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
In that case, the plaintiffs brought a complaint against the DOE for failing to enforce
college and university compliance with Title VI in awards of race-conscious financial
aid. The court dismissed the case pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act because
the plaintiffs had not exhausted other remedies. Id. at 485.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
208 59 Fed. Reg. at 8757.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 The DOE's guidelines recognize that Title VI does apply and thus it cannot pro-
hibit private individuals or organizations from awarding race-based scholarships and
other financial aid. Id.
212 Id. at 8757-58.
213 Although Yale University is a private school, similar events could occur at a pub-
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flicts developed between the university and the donor, and Bass demanded
that the school permit him to oversee both the subject matter of the gift and
appointments to his endowed chairs.215 Yale's policy, however, is to deny
such requests. 216 Noting a long-standing tradition of uneasy relations be-
tween colleges and universities and their benefactors, one commentator
wrote that "no amount of money would be worth countenancing
Steinbrennerism in the academy. 2 7 Although the issue of control was not
the only problem Yale had with Mr. Bass's gift, it was one of the factors
that resulted in rescission of his donation.18
The Yale fiasco illustrates several important considerations. One point is
that colleges and universities traditionally have kept the bulk of control over
donated endowment funds.219 If the DOE guidelines on private financial
aid and the need for Title VI compliance apply in cases of race-conscious
endowments, the implication is that a school similarly may need to comply
with either Principle Three or Principle Four. Therefore, the Title VI poli-
cies might permit race-conscious endowments only upon a finding of neces-
sity for the accomplishment of diversity goals or to remedy past discrimina-
tion. Further, that type of funding might come under similar court scrutiny.
When a public school deals with a private donor, the distinction between
public and private actors blurs. One columnist noted that the public/private
distinction is fairly illusory, given that state universities frequently adminis-
ter private gifts, that business contributions to scholarships are presumably
tax-free, and that the government's policy will be racially biased toward
private discrimination because caucasian-only scholarships would violate the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Despite the uncertain distinction between public
and private actors, scholarships frequently are considered private. One might
argue, therefore, that endowments are similar to scholarships. Thus, to avoid
scrutiny, schools may be wise to leave as much control as possible in a
donor's hand.
Of course, many endowments are not blatantly race-conscious. Even an
lic school.
214 Massimo Calabresi, How to Lose $20 Million, TIME, Mar. 27, 1995, at 69.
215 Id.
216 Id.
21 Andrew Delbanco, Contract With Academia: The Culture War's Threat to the
Education Social Compact, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 1995, at 7 (referring to the micro-
management techniques of New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner).
218 Id. This is apparently the largest rescinded donation in the history of American
education. Id.
219 Yale University's president struggled with the dean of Yale College because the
president wanted to keep the bulk of the Bass endowment money within the university's
core endowment. See Calabresi, supra note 214, at 69, who called the incident the
"king of all fund-raising foul-ups."
220 Kinsley, supra note 202, at 76.
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endowment for an African-American studies program need not designate an
African-American scholar as the required or preferred recipient. This creates
another way in which endowments may increase diversity on campus, with-
out warranting strict scrutiny. Schools and private donors could designate
only the subject matter of the chair or new department, leaving open the
criteria for the candidates. Given current educational trends, specifying only
the subject matter of the endowment should increase diversity in both curric-
ula and faculty composition. For example, Professor Delgado stated that
current trends in education include multicultural classes."' Specifically, he
noted that current "hot topics" in legal education include feminist legal
theory and critical legal studies.222 As Professor Delgado noted, it is possi-
ble that many nonminority professors simply do not desire to teach in these
fields, and most radical feminist scholars are women and most critical race
theory scholars are minorities.223 Delgado concluded, "[L]aw schools are
not required to ignore ... that color, gender, and life experience sometimes
matter."'
Another possible way to differentiate faculty selection from student
admissions and Podberesky is to focus on the concept of academic freedom.
"Academic freedom," as defined by the Supreme Court's concept of consti-
tutional academic freedom, is the qualified right of an institution to be free
from government interference in its core administrative activities.' There
are several problems with the concept of academic freedom. One is the lack
of an adequate analysis of the academic freedom that the Constitution pro-
tects.' Professor Peter Byrne identifies another problem with academic
freedom-that "American law operates on an impoverished understanding of
the unique and complex functions performed by our colleges and universi-
ties . . . [which] require legal provisions tailored to their own goals and
problems."227 Because of the nature of the faculty selection process (in-
cluding tenure decisions), the courts are ill-equipped to discern whether such
hiring decisions are constitutional.2" According to Professor Byrne, "con-
stitutional academic freedom cannot be violated by any personnel decision
based upon professional competence," made in good faith, and on academic
grounds.229 Therefore, a court's only inquiry should be whether a contested
faculty decision was made in good faith. 3
22 Delgado, supra note 137, at 1013-14.
m Id.
Id. at 1016.
2' Id. at 1016.
J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment,"
99 YALE L.J. 251, 311 (1989).
22 Id. at 253.
227 Id. at 254.
Id. at 306.
29 Id. at 306.
"o Id. at 307. Justice Powell also championed certain aspects of academic freedom,
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Based upon this support for institutional autonomy and academic free-
dom, affirmative action programs may survive challenge, even after
Podberesky, if only because of judicial respect for the decisionmakers and
an inability of courts to scrutinize the factors a faculty committee considered
and weighed. Academic freedom seems to support, in particular, freedoms
relating to endowment. If academic freedom requires deference to schools
regarding curricula decisions,231 a school's establishment of an endowed
chair in a particular field of study should be granted equal deference.
When pitted against criticism232 and an apparent trend in the Supreme
Court to reject affirmative action programs," even the academic freedom
rationale does not seem strong enough, however, to save faculty hiring pro-
grams from challenges. Therefore, the extent to which courts will defer to
schools regarding notions of academic freedom is uncertain.
V. CONCLUSION
In Podberesky, the Fourth Circuit refused to strengthen affirmative ac-
tion on college and university campuses. Certain portions of the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning may be used to reduce further the role affirmative action
plays in public colleges and universities. In several respects, the decision
has possible negative implications in a scholastic setting beyond student
admissions and financial aid programs. Rather than follow the less restric-
tive yet greater number of test factors enunciated in Paradise, the Fourth
Circuit's test is more conducive to upholding affirmative action programs
because it encompasses a broader variety of factors. The court also rejected
the district court's view that education should be considered in a different
light than employment affirmative action.
The Fourth Circuit's narrowly tailored analysis in Podberesky is fairly
writing that he "approve[d] the pursuit by a democratically governed faculty of robust
intellectual exchange achieved in part through racial and other forms of diversity."
Carrington, supra note 175, at 1177 (citing Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311-16 (1978) (Powell J.)).
2 Byrne, supra note 225, at 257.
23 Critics have many possible arguments against academic freedom. For example,
tension occurs when the freedom protects the pursuit and teaching of ideas contrary to
popular opinion, leading to complaints from those with different viewpoints. William H.
Daugherty, Jr., The Legal Nature of Academic Freedom in United States Colleges and
Universities, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1991). Others objected when some col-
leges and universities used it as a means to withhold documents issued in the tenure
review process. Id. at 243. Following the Supreme Court's decision in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (finding no evidentiary privilege in aca-
demic freedom when a rejected tenure applicant alleges impermissible discrimination), it
seems discovery will trump academic freedom's claim of confidentiality in peer review.
Daugherty, supra, at 246.
" See supra Part II.
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restrictive. Although other courts have indicated that past harms may be
considered broadly-for example, statewide rather than at specific colleges and
universities-the Fourth Circuit required evidence of past harm to a specific
type of individual to justify scholarship relief.
Finally, although many academics favor separate treatment of the faculty
hiring process, little precedential supports this desire. Therefore, the logical
extension of a holding that restricts affirmative action in student selection is to
restrict similarly its effects on other aspects of colleges and universities. For all
of these reasons, the Fourth Circuit's opinion should give college and university
administrators a reason to fear invalidation of their other programs.
Schools may continue to take certain steps to save existing programs in the
endowment and faculty selection areas. First, schools should argue that the
endowment and faculty selection realms of the college or university are unlike
student selection and thus should not be restricted by Podberesky. Creating
new courses and departments in diverse areas and subjects also will increase
diversity. Finally, colleges and universities may look to the notion of academic
freedom, which should remove the courts from close scrutiny of core academic
functions.
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